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Theorizing about religious liberty and the Constitution tends too often to operate
in a sphere untouched by fact, or at least, touched only by a narrow set of decided cases.
Cases are couched in the following terms: a sincere religious believer is pitted against an
impersonal government. That is not to say the believer always wins, but rather to point
out that most of the disputes that occupy constitutional scholars involve this inherent
imbalance of power and involve no one beyond the believer and the state. From within
this narrow confine, it becomes nearly irrational to take the government’s position and
irresistibly tempting to assume that the religious believer is part of a “minority religion”
that cannot operate the levers of power effectively. Thus, the “high ground” is identified
as that occupied by the believer while all other interests are low.
I have written fairly extensively on the fact that this is not a very enlightened
framework from within which to judge theories of religious liberty. In fact, it is
dangerous for the vulnerable.1 Moreover, it is not empirically sound to jump to the
conclusion that any particular religious entity is an oppressed institution in the political
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context, even if it is small. In fact, the majority in Employment Div. v. Smith, was correct
to point out that in the United States there is a general preference for religious liberty,
which is felt in the legislative process.
Just as a society believes in the negative protection accorded to the press
by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the
dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative
protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that
value in its legislation as well. It is therefore not surprising that a number of
states have made exception to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use. 2
“Minority” and even hated religions have done quite well in the legislative process, from
peyote exemptions, to medical neglect exemptions for faith-healing, and the use of
communion wine during Prohibition.3
Add to this mix a powerful social taboo against criticizing religious entities,
clergy, or beliefs in public, and you end up with a set of discussions and doctrine that are
anemic. The sometimes thin gruel of discourse about religious liberty is not solely the
responsibility of scholars of religion or societal taboos, though. It is also a result of
religious beliefs that forbid believers from telling outsiders about internal bad behavior.
In other words, religious institutions act to suppress negative information in ways that
then falsify reality to outsiders.
There has been an enormous amount of information regarding the internal
operation of religious organizations coming to the public’s attention in the last five to ten
years as a result of the child sex abuse issues within the Roman Catholic Church (RCC),4
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the Fundamentalist Latter-Day Saints (FLDS),5 the Jehovah’s Witnesses (JW)6 and more
recently the Orthodox Jewish community (Orthodox). 7 While there had been coverage
of childhood sexual abuse by clergy in the RCC since the 1980s, the institutional role in
furthering the abuse did not come to public light until reporters at the Boston Globe in
2002 broke the story of the coverup of abuse and the moving around of pedophile priests
by bishops.
In each of these religious communities (among others), there has been an
acknowledged rule (or theological principle) that forbade the airing of dirty laundry to
outsiders. In the RCC, there has been a rule against “scandal,” which included stiff
penalties, including excommunication, if believers told those outside the faith about
problems within it.8 In the Orthodox community, it is referred to as “chilul hashem.” The
phrase literally means "desecration of God's name," but is used to prohibit giving the
community a bad name.
Theories about institutions indicate that they often operate to perpetuate
themselves, and this is obviously one way that religious institutions can secure
themselves from public criticism. This is a rule, though, that ensures that the vulnerable
within the organizations will not receive the protection they need. It guarantees not only
that the organization’s reputation is not defiled but also that a cycle of abuse or
mistreatment is fueled. The problem, actually, does not stop at children, but also extends
to emotionally and otherwise disabled adults.
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Why is this relevant to constitutional discourse? For two reasons. First, there has
been a recent uptick in interest regarding theories of “religious autonomy” for religious
institutions.9 Purely as a matter of operation, autonomy would reach the same results
legally as the scandal rule. Second, the appearance of legislative free exercise statutes
enacting the constitutional standard of strict scrutiny, such as the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and the state
rfras. If the former were to come into effect or the latter were applied enthusiastically,
there is the potential that constitutional doctrine might work hand in glove with hiding
and perpetuating abuse of the vulnerable.

I.

The Scandal Rule

For ease of discussion, I will refer to the principle of internal secrecy that runs
across religious entities as the “scandal rule.” The rule operates primarily to block the
flow of information. First, and most obviously, it impedes the movement of information
from within the organization to the following: (1) law enforcement; (2) the media
(including news coverage and commentary and talk shows like Oprah and Larry King);
(3) state agencies and lawmakers; and (4) other nonprofit organizations, social leaders,
and powerful philanthropists. Except for the last category, each of these information
recipients are the usual means of passing information of interest on to the public. With
the information stopping at the edge of the religious organization, the people have very
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little chance of learning the existence of the bad behavior. This means that the ability of
outsiders to stop the bad behavior – even when those outsiders are charged with
punishing, deterring, or monitoring that particular form of behavior -- is stymied from
the beginning.
Second, it blocks information flow between believers within the organization.
The way the rule typically operates, the information is shared with as few people as
possible even within the organization. Thus, in the RCC, until the Boston Globe stories,
there was no open sharing of information between priests about the abusive practices of
their fellow priests. This means that insiders, who are the most invested in the
organization, lack the information necessary to reform the organization.
The scandal rule is not just a regulation of information, though. It is also an
important means by which clergy maintain power over their flocks. When bad behavior
(especially when it has a criminal element) can only be addressed in-house, the
leadership’s role of spiritual advisor expands to include civil judge, jury, and/or case
worker. That does not mean they take on all of the functions of these social actors, but
rather that they displace them.
The scandal rule makes the vulnerable even more vulnerable than one might
think, because even when outsiders become aware of the harm occurring and therefore
might intervene, co-religionists10 will enforce the scandal rule. A recent confirmation of
this reality involved Justice Prosser on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. When he was a
prosecutor, parents learned of their child’s abuse by a priest and intended to press
charges. The local prosecutor at the time, Prosser, accompanied by a deacon and another
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member of the parish, went to the family’s home to urge the parents not to publicly
embarrass the RCC.11
Not only co-religionists will acquiesce – consciously or unconsciously -- in the
rule of secrecy, though. It is common knowledge that prosecutors across the country
received reports regarding sexual abuse by RCC priests and when approached by the
local bishop agreed to let the diocese handle its own “dirty laundry.” Prosecutors
assumed that they were hearing about isolated events, not a church-wide, mandated
process for handling abuse secretly. Their lack of information was attributable to the
relative success of the scandal rule; prosecutors simply did not have the quantum of
information needed for them to suspect the larger, insidious pattern. Alternatively,
prosecutors saw a pattern but believed in the social myth that religious entities are
equipped to handle the suffering of anyone hurt, including those sexually abused.
Similarly, numerous news sources furthered the scandal rule when the bishops
pressured them to keep the abuse and the bishops’ knowledge of the abuse secret. The
Philadelphia Inquirer fired reporter Richard Cipriano for writing a story exposing the
Philadelphia Archdiocese’s handling of clergy abuse and the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel
moved Maria Rohde off the church beat when she started to dig too deeply. And while
the Boston Globe broke the coverup story first, they sat on the story for well over a year
before going to press.
Religious organizations also invest in keeping the information protected by the
scandal rule out of the public eye. Right now, in New York, the Catholic Conference is
investing $100,000/year for a public relations firm to kill legislation pending in the New
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York legislature that would eliminate the statute of limitations for child sex abuse for a
year. In Colorado, Archbishop Chaput hired the most expensive public relations firm in
Denver to accomplish the same end. Why? Because such legislation forces their secret
information public, as happened in California when similar legislation was in place
during 2003. The FLDS has one of the most expensive and effective public relations
firms in Utah go into hyperdrive whenever news leaks out about its polygamous
practices.
Look at the reality of what has happened in the FLDS community, one of the most
secretive organizations (with dazzling resources and public relations). For years, Warren
Jeffs routinely took underage girls across state and international lines to be married to
much older men in plain violation of the Mann Act.12 Only intense pressure on the FBI,
mostly coming from groups like Tapestry and CPP (groups of formerly polygamous
wives and/or children) led it to name him one of the Top 10 Most Wanted and then to
apprehend him. In 2008, Texas Child Protective Services responded to a report of abuse
at the FLDS’s Yearning for Zion Ranch compound in Eldorado, Texas, and took all of
the children into custody. Based on the TCPS most recent report, over 25% of pubescent
girls at the Yearning for Zion Ranch compound in Texas had been the victims of
statutory rape, with over half of those resulting in pregnancies: "12 girls were 'spiritually'
married at ages ranging from 12 to 15, and seven of these girls have had one or more
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children."13 Willie Jessop responded to the report with the claim that it was just a
“sensational bid” to make the sect look bad. The numbers, though, are in all likelihood
an undercount, because girls were instructed to lie about their ages and the sect does not
file birth certificates, making it impossible to verify exact age.
The ultra-Orthodox community has enforced the scandal rule vigilantly and
successfully until very recently. Now, there is an ongoing debate among rabbis
regarding the appropriateness of telling the authorities about child sex abuse, with some
adhering to the scandal rule while others are putting together a proposal that would send
the information through inside channels and then to the authorities, an approach that the
RCC crafted at its Dallas meeting following the Boston Globe’s revelations. Suffice it to
say that the scandal rule has not been removed from the culture of the RCC, with
Cardinal George of Chicago and Archbishop Timothy Dolan of Milwaukee (now New
York) most recently covering up information about abusers.
Two contemporary developments in the field of religious liberty threaten to
intensify the negative externalities generated by the scandal rule. They have been
attractive to religious entities and extremely troubling to children’s advocates and those
who work to protect the vulnerable from religious entities. First is the notion of religious
“autonomy,” a benign enough label papering over peril for children and disabled adults.
Second is the movement to enact laws that protect religious exercise by imposing strict
scrutiny across the board, like RFRA, RLUIPA, and the state Rfras.

II.

The Theory of Religious Autonomy (for Institutions)
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The notion of “autonomy” from the law is couched in libertarian terms, but
creates the opportunity for licentiousness of the people or institutions, which the founding
generation rightly feared. Although there are various iterations of it, Douglas Laycock
describes the principle as follows: “[F]rom the view that religious liberty consists of
minimizing governmental influence and maximizing individual choice, government best
protects religious liberty in the usual case by exempting religious practices from
regulation.”14
With the scandal rule in place, there is no need for an autonomy rule – if the
information regarding bad behavior never goes beyond the elite clergy and isolated
clusters of members, the law cannot be enforced and need not be avoided in the courts or
the public. That means that the autonomy theory, if it were to become law, would
operate as a substitute for the disabled scandal rule; if the secrets cannot be kept and,
therefore, the law will be brought to bear, legal autonomy would be needed to avoid
accountability, legal punishment and penalties.
The primary problem with autonomy in general is that it often incorporates
unaccountability. The law is not only a burden on relevant conduct but also an impetus
to act in certain ways. For example, look at the experiences in the states regarding child
abuse reporting. When reporting requirements started to appear, either it did not occur to
legislators that they would need to impose such a requirement on clergy and religious
institutions or religious entities requested exemptions and legislators knew too little to
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challenge them.15 When religious entities operate with the scandal rule in place,
lawmakers are disabled from protecting the vulnerable due to lack of knowledge. It
should not be surprising that once the “scandal” broke in 2002, states with clergy
exemptions started to change their statutes to include reporting for clergy.16
The Supreme Court has never adopted the “autonomy” theory in the sense that
some today advance it.17 At most, it has forbidden courts from interpreting religious
doctrine or making ecclesiastical choices.18
This is an odd cultural environment, with the burgeoning information about
abuse, within which to push the autonomy theory. Finally, the long-hidden abuse in
multiple religious communities has come to the public’s attention. On further reflection,
though, perhaps the current push for legal autonomy is reactionary.
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It is evident that the RCC bishops yearn to return to the era when the scandal rule
held significant sway.19

III.

RFRA, RLUIPA, and State Rfras

Like “autonomy,” the RFRA strict scrutiny formula looks most appropriate when
untethered to unpleasant facts. When passed, members of Congress had good intentions
but too little information, in part because of the success of the scandal rule across
religious denominations. From 1990-93, when RFRA was being formulated and debated,
there were inklings of a pattern of abuse within the RCC, but there was no widespread or
public knowledge of the complicity of bishops and the Vatican. The last question
members of Congress would have asked is whether RFRA would impact negatively on
children. That is not just a result of the general taboo against talking negatively about
religion (a most potent taboo for politicians seeking voting blocs), but also the success of
the scandal rule, which secured the facts in “secret archives,” to which only bishops were
admitted, and far from collective consciousness.
I do not want to overexaggerate the success of the scandal rule. When the issue is
abuse, keeping a tight lid on information has been increasingly difficult as the legal status
of children and abuse victims in general has improved. State agencies charged with
children’s welfare were aware of children being hurt in religious environments before
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2002, to be sure, and they strongly opposed RFRA once they understood that it would
impact their efforts to save children. One of the most serious problems with RFRA was
its enormous scope and the impossibility for those whose interests would be harmed to
comprehend its impact when it was being enacted. The verbiage surrounding its passage
was all about “religious liberty.” Indeed, there was an agreement among religious groups
that they would not discuss the particular policy reasons they sought under RFRA,
because it would lead to too much in-fighting. For example, the Christian Legal Society
was most interested in RFRA because it wanted to create opportunities for evangelical
Christians and others to refuse to rent apartments to homosexuals or unmarried couples, a
principle that the progressive mainstream Protestants could not have supported. So
everybody spoke solely about the virtue of religious liberty and overruling the Supreme
Court’s decision in Employment Div. v. Smith without any really serious discussion about
what practices the religious groups hoped to be able to engage in that were at risk if they
did not have the benefit of strict scrutiny. In other words, there was a secrecy agreement.
Abstraction and political rhetoric were the order of the day, not facts.
In operation, RFRA did affect children’s issues, leading children’s advocates to
oppose re-enactment of RFRA after it was held unconstitutional in Boerne v. Flores.20
They were one of the main reasons (along with the cities and municipalities) that the
Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA) was never passed,21 which illustrates that once
the facts are brought to the attention of legislators, they are capable of denying demands
by religious entities. But in the absence of facts, the balance almost always tips in favor
of the religious lobbyists.
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Conclusion
The scandal rule creates an environment within religious organizations that is
propitious for those who would abuse children and disabled adults. But it also has
external effects that make it much more difficult for those in civil society to protect the
vulnerable. When discussing the merits of autonomy or high protection of religious
liberty, the scandal rule needs to be one of the foci for debate. Without acknowledging
its powerful presence and operation, it is far too easy to permit religious entities to
operate in a sphere that perpetuates suffering.
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